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Good Morning. On behalf of the 1.4 million workers 
represented by the Teamsters, I am pleased to have this 
opportunity to talk to you about one of the three questions 
posed to the Commission. As the largest private sector union 
in the country, the Teamsters represent a cross-section of the 
American work force, covered by approximately 26,000 collective 
bargaining agreements. 
You have been presented with many proposals calling for 
much needed reforms in our labor laws. A number address how to 
encourage broader labor-management cooperation and employee 
participation. It is indeed ironic that we find ourselves 
focused today on whether the section of the NLRA that bars 
employer domination of labor organizations should be relaxed to 
further this goal. More important is how those sections of the 
law through which employees themselves can organize to obtain 
their own independent voice in labor-management affairs can be 
strengthened. 
This diversion of attention from the areas that would 
truly respond to your Commission's mission is the result of an 
intense employer publicity campaign surrounding the 1992 
Electromation decision of the National Labor Relations Board. 
As the General Counsel of the union that pursued the unfair 
labor practice charges giving rise to that case, I feel 
required to challenge those who proclaim the decision tolls the 
death knell of labor-management cooperation. 
Clearly, it is possible for labor and management to 
negotiate employee involvement programs that are mutually 
beneficial. That is occurring today in numerous workplaces 
under current labor law. 
In many areas, reform of labor law is drastically needed, 
but this is not one of them. 
Section 8(a)(2) still performs the key function envisioned 
by the creators of the Labor Act. It keeps employers from 
using employee involvement programs as a vehicle to dominate or 
interfere with the formation or administration of a true, 
independent worker voice. 
Indeed, those who really believe in the constructive role 
of employee involvement should have no fear of the current 
safeguards of 8(a)(2) and the NLRB application of the law. 
What the law bars is employer-dominated or employer-
controlled committees of workers dealing with working 
conditions. 
There are such committees - in both union and non-union 
workplaces — that have satisfied the NLRB interpretation of 
Section 8(a)(2) . 
Those who propose throwing out this provision of labor law 
most often don't have labor-management cooperation as their 
goal. Instead, they seek a more sophisticated device to block 
and suppress the independent, free voice of workers. 
They seek not to expand worker involvement in workplace 
decision-making, but rather to maximize management control. 
In the past, some employers formed so-called "company" 
unions to subvert true worker representation and did so openly. 
More often today, in a more sophisticated era, such employers 
seek a similar result through various forms of "workplace 
committees" which they dominate or control and which are the 
equivalent of company unions in fact. 
Both are contrary to both the law and sound labor-
management policy. 
The practices the NLRB barred in Electromation and the 
circumstances surrounding the employer's reaction to various 
forms of employee participation that occurred at its Indiana 
plant vividly demonstrate why the protections of Section 
8(a) (2) are needed as much today as they were when the section 
was first enacted in 1935. 
The Teamsters employed by Electromation, a manufacturer of 
electrical components, have a more complete story to tell than 
the sanitized versions of the facts often reported in some 
media. According to the union's chief steward, Berna Price, a 
15 year employee, Electromation's production employees are 
predominantly working women who make $6 an hour. Its 
management has been entirely male and the desired skilled 
maintenance jobs have been held by males making over $10 per 
hour. 
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At a 1988 Christmas party, Electromation's management 
announced that it was unilaterally imposing several cuts in 
benefits, including a lump-sum bonus instead of a raise, and a 
more stringent absenteeism control program. 
After the company announced these unilateral benefit cuts, 
68 workers signed a petition protesting these changes. In a 
panic, management established the so called "action committees" 
generally limiting their agenda to the areas affected by the 
cuts, not to the areas of improving efficiency or quality of 
the product. The action committees were a way of handling 
workers' frustration about the benefit reductions. The 
company's president made it clear, however, that the benefit 
programs would not be restored to pre-Christmas levels. In the 
end, Electromation's employees say that one of the main reasons 
why they participated in the action committees was to get a 
paid break from the tedium of their jobs. 
The Company's Employee Benefits Manager was assigned to 
coordinate the activities of the action committees. Management 
reserved the right to select the six employees to serve on each 
committee from among those who signed the volunteer sheets. 
The introductory language on each sheet proclaiming the goal of 
the committee was drafted by management, without employee 
input. The employees did not vote to ratify the selection of 
their representatives on the committees. Further, the 
committees had no authority to implement decisions, but could 
only draft proposals for management's acceptance or veto. 
* 
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The committees began meeting in late January and early 
February, 1989. On February 13, 1989, Teamsters Local 1049 
(now Local 364) reguested voluntary recognition from 
Electromation. Shortly thereafter, each committee was advised 
by the management representatives that the management personnel 
could no longer attend. The committees soon disbanded. 
The Board found that "the Action Committees were the 
creation of the [Employer] and that the impetus for their 
continued existence rested with the [Employer] and not with the 
employees." That being so, the Board concluded that "by 
creating the Action Committees, Electromation imposed on 
employees its own unilateral form of bargaining or dealing and 
thereby violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) as alleged." 
Most official accounts of the Electromation case end with 
management's withdrawal from the action committees following 
the Teamsters' official reguest for recognition. But what 
happened afterwards further refutes the notion that 
Electromation's call for these action committees was in any way 
an enlightened effort to elicit independent employee 
participation in its labor-management affairs. Rather than 
stepping back and letting the workers freely choose their own 
vehicle for representation, management brought out plenty of 
old fashioned scare tactics during the Teamster organizing 
drive. It threatened employees with tales of other unionized 
plants in the area which closed, featuring pictures of 
tombstones symbolizing those plants. It subjected employees to 
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captive audience meetings which included the showing of anti-
union movies. It also promised to reinstate the action 
committees if the employees voted against the Teamsters. 
A male supervisor encouraged female employees to vote 
against the Union while putting his arm around them. These 
employees pursued a sexual harassment complaint. 
Not surprisingly, after all this, the Union lost the 
election. However, in a rerun election that was held because 
of the employer's misconduct, the workers voted for Teamster 
representation. 
During negotiations for a contract, Electromation laid off 
all but three of its employees due to a purported loss of 
business. Because the Union lacked bargaining power, Chief 
Steward Berna Price reports that eventually the rank-and-file 
negotiating committee on which she participated accepted a 
contract which fell short of their hopes. It was a modest 
contract addressing the employer's purported need for financial 
relief, but it also enabled the employees to recoup some 
aspects of the prior cuts. 
The depth of management's aversion to any real employee 
involvement in workplace decisions, however, was evidenced by 
its steadfast refusal to include a standard arbitration 
requirement that unresolved grievances be decided by a neutral 
third party. Shortly after the contract was ratified without 
this feature, Electromation's business mysteriously picked up 
and most workers were recalled from layoff. 
Last October, before the first contract expired, a 
decertification petition was filed. An election is scheduled 
for this Friday. Management has refused to negotiate until the 
election takes place. Last week, Electromation's management 
told employees at a meeting, "we don't need a third party, do 
we?" 
Apparently, Berna Price is an acceptable "employee 
participant" when she sits in an action committee controlled by 
management, but she and her fellow workers take on the nasty 
spectre of an outside third party when they assert those same 
concerns through an independent labor organization of their own 
choosing. 
The situation the NLRB confronted in Electromation turns 
out to be no different than cases involving ttte abuses of 
management-initiated and controlled "employee committees" which 
have typified the NLRB's application of Section 8(a) (2) in the 
past several decades. 
According to a recent study by Cornell University labor-
education coordinator, James Rundle, during the past 22 years 
the NLRB has issued only 58 decisions ordering the disbanding 
of employee committees under Section 8(a)(2). He found that, 
in 56 out of the 58 cases, the committees were established 
during organizing drives or by employers who committed other 
unfair labor practices. Rundle reports: "There is absolutely 
no evidence that the NLRB has ever, in the past 2 2 years, 
• 
disestablished a committee of the type employers say they must 
have to be competitive." 
Contrary to the belief of many that Section 8(a)(2) 
creates an all or nothing choice between adversarial collective 
bargaining and cooperation, Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the 
original NLRA, believed that collective bargaining was the 
necessary precondition for genuine cooperation. He emphasized 
that Section 8(2) was included in the Act on the judgment that 
only the growth of true employee labor organizations — 
created, structured, and administered by the organization's 
employee members — could, over the long-run further the 
development of truly cooperative labor relations. 
"Most impartial students of industrial problems," Senator 
v. 
Wagner noted in 1935, "agree that the highest degree of 
cooperation between industry and labor is possible only when 
either side is free to act or to withdraw, and that the best 
records of mutual respect and mutual accomplishment have been 
made by employers dealing with independent labor 
organizations." The overall goals of the NLRA, therefore, was 
"cooperation between employers and employees, dealing with one 
another on an equal footing." 
Women, like Berna Price — the Teamsters chief steward at 
Electromation — are particularly sensitive to claims of 
empowerment that are just window dressing. If indeed there is 
to be effective labor management cooperation, let us reach that 
goal by fostering relationships where working women and men can 
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address their workplace conditions on an equal footing with 
management as envisioned by Senator Wagner. 
Those whose only idea of labor law reform is to dump 
Section 8(a)(2) most often seek domination of their workers, 
rather than partnership with them. 
My 2 0 years of experience as a labor lawyer have taught me 
that the best examples of labor management cooperation occur at 
the bargaining table where equal partners tackle hard problems 
and develop common ground although their interests are not 
entirely identical. I defy anyone who has gone through the 
negotiating experience to suggest that meaningful resolution of 
issues like health insurance, pension coverage, job security 
and health and safety are not greatly enhanced if the workers' 
representative has an independent voice, resources and the 
expertise to bring this discussion. 
* * * 
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